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OUT ON A LIMB WITHOUT DIRECTION: HOW THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FOX v. FCC FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS BROADCAST INDECENCY AND WHY THE SUPREME 
COURT MUST CORRECT THE CONFUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
During a live broadcast of the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono, the lead 
singer of the band U2, accepted his award by exclaiming, “[t]his is really, 
really fucking brilliant.  Really, really great.”1  These words sparked a 
firestorm between the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 
viewers who found Bono’s statement to be indecent and obscene.2  While it 
may be potentially shocking, how many times have you watched a live 
interview on television and the response contained curse words or an 
inappropriate statement?  Perhaps the respondent was elated about a sporting 
event, angered by an accident or simply, just plain crude.  Does the 
Constitution protect these statements as free speech?3  The answer is maybe.  
As broadcasters continued to push the envelope with more controversial 
programming, the FCC began to significantly tighten regulations for what 
constituted an acceptable broadcast.4 
The primary purpose of the FCC is to regulate “communications by radio, 
television, wire, satellite and cable.”5  Until 2003, the FCC generally practiced 
a restrained enforcement policy toward indecent broadcasts.6  Between 2002 
and 2003, the FCC filed zero notices of apparent liability (NAL) regarding 
 
 1. In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859 (2003) [hereinafter Golden Globes]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter First Amendment] (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 4. See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text. 
 5. About the FCC, Fed. Communications Comm’n, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 6. See Matthew C. Holohan, Politics, Technology, & Indecency: Rethinking Broadcast 
Regulation in the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 341, 345 (“Indecency was essentially a 
non-issue for the first three years of former FCC Chairman Michael Powell’s tenure, as the 
Commission worked to relax ownership restrictions in the broadcast industry.”). 
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television broadcasts.7  This lax policy changed after Bono’s statement during 
the 2003 Golden Globe Awards8 and the infamous Super Bowl half-time show 
in 2004 when Janet Jackson’s breast was exposed to millions of viewers of all 
ages.9 
In response to the statement made by Bono during the Golden Globe 
Awards, the Parents Television Council filed a complaint stating that the 
material violated the FCC’s regulations against obscenity and indecency.10  
The Enforcement Bureau rejected this complaint on two grounds.  First, they 
found that the F-word, while potentially crude or offensive, was not used to 
“describe or depict sexual and excretory activities and organs.”11  Second, the 
Bureau cited past precedent that “fleeting and isolated remarks of this nature 
do not warrant Commission action.”12 
Nearly six months later, the full FCC Board overruled the Enforcement 
Bureau’s decision which prompted a new policy on fleeting expletives.13  This 
policy abolished the protection given to networks when isolated or fleeting 
expletives were used.14  The Commission also declared that “given the core 
meaning of the F-word, any use of that word or a variation, in any context, 
inherently has a sexual connotation.”15  Despite overturning the Enforcement 
Board’s decision and finding Bono’s statements indecent, the FCC did not fine 
NBC because its ruling represented a change in FCC policy.16  This revised 
policy strengthened the FCC’s power to hold networks liable for the use of 
fleeting expletives.17  With broadcasters now on notice for the new policy, Fox, 
CBS and ABC, among others, brought suit against the FCC.18  On June 4, 
2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the FCC’s revised 
policy calling it “arbitrary and capricious.”19  While the court came to a logical 
conclusion, the reasoning behind the decision merely presented a short-term 
solution to a long-term issue.  By failing to decide whether the FCC could 
 
 7. Indecency Complaints and NALS, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/ichart.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 8. See Golden Globes, supra note 1. 
 9. See Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC Crack Down on 
Indecency, 22 SPG COMM. LAW 1, 9 (2004).  During the 2004 Super Bowl half time performance, 
Justin Timberlake removed a piece of Janet Jackson’s bustier exposing her right breast.  Id. 
 10. See Golden Globes, supra note 1. 
 11. Id. at 19861. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of 
the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes II]. 
 14. See id. at 4980. 
 15. Id. at 4978. 
 16. Id. at 4981–82. 
 17. See id. at 4982. 
 18. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 19. Id. at 455. 
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regulate fleeting expletives, the court left broadcasters to twist in the wind.  
Television and radio stations were forced to choose between the increasingly 
restrictive FCC policies or the more ‘broadcast friendly’ ruling in the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Fox v. FCC.  On March 17, 2008, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged this dilemma and granted the Solicitor General’s petition for 
certiorari. 
In this article, I argue that in order to remove the cloud of confusion over 
broadcast indecency, the Supreme Court must address and clarify the 
substantive rights afforded to broadcasters by the Constitution.  Part I explores 
the basic regulatory functions of the FCC.  Part II traces the extensive history 
of the FCC and how its power to regulate broadcasts evolved up until the 2003 
Golden Globe Awards.  Part III discusses the Golden Globe Awards decision 
along with the major shifts in FCC policy leading up to Fox v. FCC.  Part IV 
summarizes the majority and dissenting opinion in Fox v. FCC.  Part V 
analyzes the reasoning of the case’s majority and dissenting opinion.  Part VI 
discusses how the court should have decided the case on constitutional grounds 
and why the court’s failure to do so negatively impacted broadcasters and 
forced future litigation.  Part VII outlines the arguments each party made to the 
Supreme Court for and against granting the writ of certiorari.  Finally, this 
article analyzes these arguments and discusses the possible routes the Supreme 
Court may go when the case is heard this fall.  If the Supreme Court intends to 
address the confusion resulting from the decision in Fox, it must address the 
substantive challenges presented by the networks. 
I.  THE BASIC REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF THE FCC 
The FCC’s power to enforce regulations against indecent speech emanates 
from 18 U.S.C. § 1464 which states “whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”20  While television 
broadcasts do not use radio transmissions, the FCC still regulates these 
broadcasts.21  Satellite transmissions, on the other hand, are not regulated by 
the FCC because they are subscription services.22  The FCC is only able to 
regulate indecent broadcasts between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.23  
 
 20. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004) [hereinafter § 1464] “Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than two years, or both.”  Id. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (2004).   
 22. Matthew S. Schwartz, A Decent Proposal: The Constitutionality of Indecency Regulation 
on Cable and Direct Broadcast Satellite Services, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 17 (2007). 
 23. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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Any broadcasts outside of these times is protected and constitutes a “safe 
harbor period.”24 
The FCC’s regulatory power is limited by both the First Amendment to the 
Constitution25 and § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934.26  The First 
Amendment protects the freedom of speech;27 however, not all speech is 
prohibited from regulation.28  Section 326 explicitly denies the FCC the right 
to censor speech, stating: 
nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission 
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted 
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or 
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by 
means of radio communication.29 
As the FCC has become more active in regulating broadcasts in the past 
decade, tensions have increased over what the FCC can and cannot regulate.  
This creates an interplay between Congress and the courts to determine the 
authority that the FCC derives from 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UNTIL 2003 GOLDEN GLOBES DECISION 
To fully grasp the significance of the FCC’s changed policies and the 
resulting broadcaster confusion, it is imperative to have a strong understanding 
 
 24. Id. at 669–70. 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 26. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2004) [hereinafter Communications 
Act]. 
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of 
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and 
no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall 
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication. No person 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication. 
Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744–45 (1978) (quoting Justice Holmes in 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was 
said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of 
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words 
*745 that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.) 
 29. Communications Act of 1934, supra note 26. 
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of the history of the FCC’s regulatory power.  This historical background 
begins with the Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Pacifica in 1978.  
Continuing from this monumental decision, this section will trace significant 
Bureau, FCC and Court decisions leading up to the 2003 Golden Globes 
decision. 
A. FCC v. Pacifica—Supreme Court Sets Early Standards for Regulation 
In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s authority 
to sanction broadcasters for airing indecent material, opening the door for an 
increase in FCC and judicial involvement in the regulation of indecent 
communications.30  In 1973, George Carlin, a satirist, went before a live 
California audience and recorded a monologue entitled “Filthy Words.”31  This 
12-minute piece was premised, as Carlin put it, as “the words you couldn’t say 
on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say, ever.”32 
On October 30, radio station WBAI-FM in New York, broadcast Carlin’s 
monologue at 2:00 p.m. as part of a discussion about language.33  Before the 
broadcast, the station issued a disclaimer stating that the monologue featured 
“sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.”34  On 
November 28, 1973, John Douglas sent a complaint to the FCC regarding the 
monologue.35  Douglas’s concern arose when he heard the monologue while 
driving in his car with his young son.36  While acknowledging some social 
value, Douglas complained that the broadcast was not appropriate for that time 
of the day given the ability of children to listen to the program.37 
In response to the complaint, Pacifica highlighted the purpose of the 
program38 and the explicit warning of sensitive language.39  Pacifica even went 
on to describe Carlin as “a significant social satirist” who “like Twain and Sahl 
before him, examines the language of ordinary people . . .Carlin is not 
 
 30. See RICHARD PARKER, FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON 
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 222 (2003).  (citing Ginsberg v. State of New York, 
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1968); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
 31. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 726. 
 32. Id. at 751.  (“The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, 
motherfucker, and tits.  Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands 
and maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor . . . and a bourbon.”). 
 33. Id. at 729–30. 
 34. Id. at 730. 
 35. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  The broadcast was played “during a program about contemporary society's attitude 
toward language.”  Id. 
 39. Id.  Before the program was broadcast, listeners had been warned that it included 
“sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.”  Id. 
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mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and 
essentially silly our attitudes towards those words.”40  In a declaratory order, 
the FCC responded that Pacifica “could have been the subject of administrative 
sanctions.”41  No sanctions were ever imposed.  The FCC found that the 
monologue was not obscene; however, the language used was determined to be 
“patently offensive.”42  The FCC articulated that the concept of decency “is 
intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, 
in terms patently offensive as measured by community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the 
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.”43  
Using this standard, the FCC found that the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue 
was “indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464.”44  In a separate comment 
issued shortly thereafter, the FCC stated that “[i]n some cases, public events 
likely to produce offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity 
for journalistic editing. Under these circumstances we believe that it would be 
inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language.”45  On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed the FCC Order on a 2-1 vote.46  The United States Supreme Court 
subsequently granted the FCC’s petition for certiorari.47 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found the FCC Order to be 
constitutional.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, analyzed whether the 
FCC’s Order was a form of censorship forbidden by § 326 of the 
Communications Act,48 whether the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue was 
indecent,49 and if so, whether the FCC’s Order violated the First Amendment 
to the Constitution.50 
 
 40. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 730. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 731. 
 43. Id. at 731–32. 
 44. Id. at 732. 
 45. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 733. 
 46. Id.  Each judge wrote separately.  Judge Tamm felt that the order was essentially 
censorship violating § 326 of the Communications Act.  Chief Judge Bazelon’s, while concurring 
with the result, reasoned that § 326 was inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by § 1464.  Judge 
Leventhal, as the lone dissent, reasoned that the FCC could regulate the language “as broadcast.”  
Id. 
 47. Id. at 734. 
 48. See Communications Act, supra note 26. 
 49. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 740.  Indecent defined as “a: altogether unbecoming: 
contrary to what the nature of things or what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or 
appropriate: hardly suitable: unseemly: not conforming to generally accepted standards of 
morality. . . .”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966). 
 50. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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First, Justice Stevens found that the FCC Order was not forbidden by § 
326.51 
It was clear that the FCC could not edit broadcasts before they were 
shown.52  However, the Court found that it was not censorship for the FCC to 
look to past program content when making the decision whether to renew a 
licensee agreement.53  Section 326 also carved out an exception to the 
censorship rule giving the FCC the power to sanction those broadcasts which 
contained “obscene, indecent or profane language.”54  Thus, the FCC Order 
was not forbidden by § 326.55 
Justice Stevens then analyzed whether Carlin’s monologue was considered 
indecent under § 1464.56  Section 1464 forbade the broadcasting of any 
“obscene, indecent, or profane language.”57  Since the FCC acknowledged that 
the monologue was not obscene, Pacifica argued that indecent and obscene 
mean virtually the same thing.58  Justice Stevens rejected this theory by 
pointing to the disjunctive nature of § 1464.59The Court found that a normal 
definition of indecent “refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of 
morality.”60  The Court left the task of determining the standards of morality to 
the FCC.  Using the FCC’s indecency standard, the broadcast of Carlin’s 
monologue was found to be indecent.61 
Justice Stevens quickly dismissed Pacifica’s claim that the First 
Amendment prohibited any regulation on public broadcasts.62  The issue facing 
 
 51. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738; see also Communications Act, supra note 26. 
 52. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738. 
 53. Id. at 746 (citing KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 60 App. D.C. 79, 
47 F.2d 670 (1931); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 61 App. D.C. 
311, 62 F.2d 850 (1932)). 
 54. Id. at 737.  See also Communications Act, supra note 26. 
 55. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 738. 
 56. Id. at 738–39. 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004). 
 58. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739.  Pacifica, knowing that their broadcast was not 
considered indecent, tried to get the Court to conflate the terms indecency and obscenity so that 
they would not be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 739–40.  Justice Stevens stated that “the words ‘obscene, indecent, or profane’ are 
written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning.”  Id. 
 60. Id. at 740. 
 61. Id.  In finding the monologue indecent, “the Commission identified several words that 
referred to excretory or sexual activities or organs, stated that the repetitive, deliberate use of 
those words in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience was patently offensive.”  
Id. 
 62. Id. at 745.  The Court pointed to numerous examples where First Amendment regulation 
was valid: 
The government may forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight.  See Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031.  It may pay heed to the 
“‘commonsense differences' between commercial speech and other varieties.”  Bates v. 
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the Court was whether “a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with 
sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content.”63  The Court 
looked to two different themes to analyze this First Amendment issue.  First, 
broadcast media in the United States had become uniquely pervasive.64  Media 
broadcasting, unlike someone speaking out in public, cannot be easily 
avoided.65  Due to this pervasiveness, Stevens suggested that “[p]atently 
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, 
not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s 
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an 
intruder.”66  Secondly, “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even 
those too young to read.”67  Carlin’s monologue aired at 2:00 p.m.68  There was 
no indication that the FCC tried to prohibit this monologue.69  The Court 
concluded that the FCC’s decision was based on a nuisance rationale.70  This 
approach emphasized the context of the broadcast.71  Justice Sutherland wrote 
that a “nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place—like a pig in 
the parlor instead of the barnyard.”72  The Court held that this nuisance was 
within the realm of the FCC’s authority to sanction a broadcaster.73 
In Justice Powell’s concurrence, he emphasized the narrowness of the 
holding.  Pertinent to this essay, Powell wrote that “the Commission’s holding, 
and certainly the Court’s holding today, does not speak to cases involving the 
isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast, 
as distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent 
here.”74 
 
State Bar of Arizona, supra, 433 U.S., at 381, 97 S.Ct., at 2707.  It may treat libels against 
private citizens more severely than libels against public officials.  See Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789.  Obscenity may be wholly 
prohibited.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419.  And only 
two Terms ago we refused to hold that a “statutory classification is unconstitutional 
because it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment.”  
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, 427 U.S., at 52, 96 S.Ct., at 2443. 
Id. 
 63. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745. 
 64. Id. at 748. 
 65. See id. at 749. 
 66. Id. at 748. 
 67. Id. at 749. 
 68. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 729–30. 
 69. See id. at 749.  The Court compares this regulation with children being prohibited from 
certain bookstores or movie theatres.  Id. 
 70. Id. at 750. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id.  (quoting Justice George Sutherland in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926)). 
 73. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750. 
 74. Id. at 760–61. 
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B. Interpretations post-Pacifica- Bureau Institutes Passive Approach 
For the next several years, a finding of indecency required a situation very 
similar to Carlin’s monologue.  This high burden made it virtually impossible 
for a station or network to be penalized.  The first test came less than a year 
after the Pacifica decision.  Morality in Media of Massachusetts, Inc. filed a 
petition to deny a license renewal application for the WGBH Educational 
Foundation75 alleging that WGBH-TV “failed in its responsibility to the 
community by consistently broadcasting offensive, vulgar, and otherwise 
material harmful to children without adequate supervision or parental 
warnings.”76  The Enforcement Bureau of the FCC denied Morality’s petition 
finding that material believed to be offensive by some is not enough to warrant 
the abandonment of a license.77 
In 1981, the American Legal Foundation (ALF) filed a petition to deny a 
license renewal application for Pacifica Foundation, licensee of Station WPFW 
(FM).78  ALF alleged several violations including a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1464.  In one example, ALF stated that on January 18, 1979 at 8:20 a.m., “a 
male announcer repeatedly used such words as ‘motherfucker,’ ‘fuck’ and 
similar indecent language.”79  Despite the frequent use of the language, the 
Enforcement Bureau found that “ALF has not shown that such use was more 
than isolated use in the course of a three year license term.”80  Therefore, 
ALF’s petition for this complaint was denied.81 
C. The Reconsideration Order—The FCC Gets Aggressive With Broadcast 
Regulation 
From 1975 to 1987, the FCC did not take any action against a single 
licensee for indecent broadcasts.82  This changed with a string of decisions 
 
 75. See In Re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation For Renewal of License for 
Noncommercial Educational Station WGBH-TV, Boston, Massachusetts, 69 F.C.C. 1250 (1978)  
[hereinafter WGBH]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 1251. 
 78. See In Re Application of Pacifica Foundation For Renewal of License for 
Noncommercial Station WPFW (FM), Washington, D.C., 95 F.C.C. 2d 750 (1983) [hereinafter 
WPFW]. 
 79. Id. at 757.  ALF also alleged that: 
WPFW’s complaint file at the Commission contains two letters which indicate that on 
October 10, 1979, at 11:50 a.m. such language as ‘mother fucker’ and ‘shit’ was 
broadcast; and on May 21, 1978, from 9:30 am to 11:30 a.m., an album which contains 
the words ‘fuck’, ‘shit’ and ‘assholes’ was broadcast. 
Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 758. 
 82. See In the Matter of Infinity Broadcasting Corporation, et al., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987) 
[hereinafter Reconsideration Order]. 
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made in April, 1987.83  The result was a significant change in policy that made 
it easier for the FCC to regulate broadcasts.84  To give broadcasters guidance 
for its new enforcement standard, the FCC issued the Reconsideration Order, 
using the April cases as examples.85  The FCC began its discussion of 
indecency by emphasizing the importance of “specific factual settings because 
of the crucial role of context to the issue.”86  The FCC stated that the indecency 
standard was the same one laid out in Pacifica in 1978.87  To determine 
whether language was “patently offensive,” the FCC would consider variables 
such as: 
an examination of the actual words or depictions in context to see if they are, 
for example, ‘vulgar’ or ‘shocking,’ a review of the manner in which the 
language or depictions are portrayed, an analysis of whether allegedly 
offensive material is isolated or fleeting, a consideration of the ability of the 
medium of expression to separate adults from children, and a determination of 
the presence of children in the audience.88 
While § 1464 gave the FCC the authority to prohibit obscene and indecent 
material, the Supreme Court had emphasized that this power may only be used 
during a reasonable time.89  Before the Reconsideration Order, 10:00 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m. was generally considered to be a safe harbor period for indecent 
broadcasting because children were not presumed to be in the audience.90  In 
the Reconsideration Order, however, the FCC explicitly rejected this bright 
line rule, stating that penalties depended on the “available data for that market” 
and whether there is a “reasonable risk that children may have been in the 
radio audience at the time of the broadcast.”91  Rather than maintain a passive 
approach to broadcast regulation, the FCC broadened its regulatory power by 
making it clear that a violation did not require a scenario similar to Carlin’s 
 
 83. Id.  See Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Rcd 2698 (1987) (KPFK-FM); The Regents of 
the University of California, 2 FCC Rcd 2703 (1987) (KCSB-FM); Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of 
Pa., 2 FCC Rcd 2705 (1987) (WYSP(FM)). 
 84. See Reconsideration Order supra note 82, at 934. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  The Pacifica decision found that a broadcast would be considered indecent if the 
language describes “in terms patently offensive as measured by community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs at times of the day when there is a 
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.”  Id. 
 88. Id. at 932. 
 89. Reconsideration Order supra note 82, at 931.  MIM was trying to persuade the court to 
apply § 1464 in a way that would prohibit certain sexually explicit broadcasts at all times during 
the day.  The court rejected this approach.  Id. 
 90. See id. at 930. 
 91. Id. at 932. 
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monologue.92  The three cases in the Reconsideration Order highlighted this 
major shift in policy.93 
For the next decade, the FCC continued to struggle to create definite 
standards.  In response to a ruling by the D.C. Court of Appeals that vacated 
the decisions punishing broadcasts occurring after 10 p.m., Congress directed 
the FCC to “enforce the provisions of . . . § 1464 on a 24 hour per day basis.”94  
The FCC followed this directive and banned all broadcasts that contained 
indecent material.95  In 1991, this total ban was struck down.96  In 1995, the 
court ruled that a “safe harbor” time period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 
was both narrowly tailored and satisfied a compelling public interest.97  During 
these times, indecent material is allowed to be broadcast without regulation.98 
D. New FCC Order Further Muddies the Water on What Is Considered 
Indecent 
In 2001, the FCC issued a “Policy Statement to provide guidance to the 
broadcast industry regarding our case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 
 
 92. Id. at 930. 
 93. See id. at 930–33. 
The first case, against KPFK-FM and Pacifica, dealt with a broadcast which occurred after 10:00 
p.m and contained portions of a long-running play from Los Angeles.  The FCC found that these 
excerpts were full of “vulgar and shocking language” that “were more than fleeting or isolated” 
and determined the language patently offensive, along with the reasonable risk that children 
might hear the broadcast, the FCC which amounted to“actionable indecency within the meaning 
of Section 1464.”  Id. 
The second case, against WYSP-FM and Infinity Broadcasting Corporation of Pennsylvania, 
dealt with the Howard Stern Show, which was broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.  
While this show contained indecent material and was aired at a time when there was a reasonable 
risk that children could be listening, the FCC emphasized the nature of the material.  Although the 
language “involved innuendo and double entrendre” and that this sort of dialogue was susceptible 
to multiple interpretations by listeners, the FCC stated that the “sexual import of certain 
references in the material was inescapable and understandable given the surrounding context of 
the discussion.”  Therefore, the FCC found the material to be actionable indecency.  Id. 
The final case, against KCSB-FM and the Regents of the University of California, dealt with a 
musical recording broadcast.  This broadcast recording contained material deemed patently 
offensive and was broadcast at a time when children may have been listening.  Despite the fact 
that the broadcast was a musical recording, the FCC emphasized that it was still subject to 
regulation. Id. 
 94. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
 95. See id. 
 96. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.Cir.1991).  The court 
reasoned that “our previous holding in Act I that the Commission must identify some reasonable 
period of time during which indecent material may be broadcast necessarily means that the 
Commission may not ban such broadcasts entirely.”  Id. 
 97. Action for Children’s Television, 58 F.3d at 669. 
 98. Id. 
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our enforcement policies with respect to broadcast indecency.”99  The FCC 
offered an analytical approach coupled with numerous examples.100 
To determine broadcast indecency, the FCC created a two-prong test where 
(1) “material must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or 
activities”101 and (2) “the broadcast must be patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.”102  To 
determine whether material was patently offensive, the full context of the 
broadcast must be considered.103  The FCC listed three principal factors that 
are important in its decision-making process.  These factors included: 
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual 
or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats 
at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether 
the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material 
appears to have been presented for its shock value.104 
The FCC repeatedly emphasized that context was critical and that no single 
factor automatically made a broadcast indecent.105 
For the first factor, the FCC noted that descriptions which are more graphic 
or explicit are more likely to be found patently offensive.106  The FCC then 
gave twelve examples of broadcasts that were either issued a warning or a fine 
for being patently offensive.107  For the second factor, the FCC emphasized 
that fleeting sexual or excretory references are generally not found to be 
indecent.108  For example, during a South Carolina broadcast, one individual 
said “[t]he hell I did, I drove mother-fucker.”109  The FCC found that the 
“broadcast contained only a fleeting and isolated utterance which, within the 
context of live and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a Commission 
sanction.”110  However, some fleeting references found to be patently offensive 
 
 99. See In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 
F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) [hereinafter Policy Statement]. 
 100. Id. at 8004. 
 101. Id. at 8002.  (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 1838, 1840–
41 (2000)). 
 102. Id.  (quoting WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 FCC Rcd 1841(2000)). 
 103. Id.  The court articulates that the “standard is that of an average broadcast viewer or 
listener and not the sensibilities of any individual complainant” when determining whether 
patently offensive.  Id. 
 104. Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8003. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 8004–07. 
 108. Id. at 8008. 
 109. Policy Statement, supra note, at 8009. 
 110. Id. 
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could be considered indecent.111  For the third factor, the FCC stressed that the 
presentation of the material is an important consideration.112  While this Order 
attempted to clarify FCC standards, the open-ended nature caused some 
difficulty for broadcasters to precisely know whether a broadcast would be 
considered appropriate. 
III.  2003 GOLDEN GLOBE AWARDS AND SUBSEQUENT SHIFTS IN FCC POLICY 
A  The Initial Golden Globe Decision—Keeping with the Past 
By 2006, after several policy changes, the FCC had reached the height of 
its indecency crackdown.113  Broadcasters were challenged to keep current 
with the ever-changing FCC indecency standards.  These new policies had 
allowed the FCC to regulate and penalize more broadcasts than ever before.  
So what happened between 2001 and 2006 to cause such a dramatic shift in 
approach to regulating broadcasts?  While one specific broadcast did not lead 
to all of the changes witnessed before Fox v. FCC, it is clear that several 
decisions altered the FCC’s policies toward indecency regulation. 
In 2003, after Bono stated “this is really, really fucking brilliant” during a 
live broadcast, the Parents Television Council filed a complaint alleging a 
violation of the FCC’s obscenity and/or indecency policy.114  The Enforcement 
Bureau rejected the complaint115 and immediately found that the material was 
not obscene.116  To determine if the broadcast was indecent, the Bureau looked 
to the definition of indecent found in the FCC’s Policy Statement released in 
2001.117  The Bureau found that the F-word used here did not “describe or 
 
 111. Id. at 8009–10.  Fleeting references to sexual activities with children can be found 
indecent.  For example a NAL was issued for this joke: “What is the best part of screwing an 
eight-year-old?  Hearing the pelvis crack.  Id. at 8009.  Also, extreme explicit references can be 
found indecent such as “suck my dick you fucking cunt.”  These cases show that a single fleeting 
expletive can be enough to justify receiving a NAL.  Id. at 8010. 
 112. Id.  A presentation on sex education may not be indecent whereas a skit for shock value 
could be.  See id. 
 113. See Indecency Complaints and NALS, at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ComplStatChart.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 114. See Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19859. 
 115. Id. at 19862. 
 116. Id. at 19861.  To determine obscenity the Bureau looked to three factors found in Miller 
v. California: 
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, must find that the 
material, as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the material must depict or 
describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable 
law; and (3) the material, taken as a whole, must lack serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value.  Id. 
 117. Id. at 19860–61.  The two factors necessary for indecency:  “First, the material alleged to 
be indecent must fall within the subject matter scope of our indecency definition-that is, the 
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depict sexual and excretory activities and organs.”118  Rather, the word was 
used as an “adjective or expletive to emphasize an exclamation.”119  The 
Bureau also emphasized that “fleeting remarks of this nature do not warrant 
Commission action.”120  This situation was nearly identical to an example in 
the 2001 Policy Statement where an individual said the F-word over a live 
broadcast.121  Because the use of the F-word was determined to not be obscene 
or indecent, the airing of the program did not violate FCC regulations.122  This 
decision reflected the view that a fleeting expletive, especially without 
referencing sexual activities or excretory functions, does not generally warrant 
an FCC sanction.123  This position was the culmination of precedent 
established after the original Pacifica decision. 
B. 2004 Super Bowl half-time Fiasco—The Winds of Change Begin to Blow 
On February 1, 2004, during the Super Bowl half-time performance, Justin 
Timberlake removed a piece of Janet Jackson’s bustier briefly exposing her 
right breast.124  This widely viewed incident garnered both the attention of the 
FCC and Congress.125  Powell, the Chairman of the FCC, immediately 
commented that the incident was a “classless, crass, and deplorable stunt.”126  
On February 11, 2004, hearings on broadcast indecency took place in the 
Senate.127  Both the House and the Senate worked extensively to give the FCC 
the power to fine violators more significantly than in the past.128  The FCC was 
becoming more vigilant toward broadcast regulation and was using its teeth to 
inflict damaging fines.129  Shortly thereafter, the FCC revisited the 
Enforcement Bureau’s Golden Globe decision.130 
 
material must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities. . . . Second, the 
broadcast must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium.”  Id. 
 118. Id. at 19861. 
 119. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19861. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8009. 
 122. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19862. 
 123. See Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8009. 
 124. Fallow, supra note 9, at 1. 
 125. Id. at 2. 
 126. Holohan, supra note 6 at 347. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id.  The House passed a bill “enabling the Commission to fine offenders up to 
$500,000 per offensive (up from the previous maximum of $27,500).”  Id.;  Fallow, supra note 9, 
at 3.  (“The Senate version would increase the statutory maximum to $275,000 for the first 
indecency violation with increasing fines up to $500,000 for the third.”). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4975. 
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C. Revisiting the Golden Globes—The FCC Changes Course 
In light of the public outcry and Congressional efforts after the Super Bowl 
fiasco, the FCC decided to review the Enforcement Bureau’s decision for the 
2003 Golden Globe Awards.131  In reviewing the Bureau’s decision, the FCC 
used the same indecency standard that required indecent material to “describe 
or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities” and be “patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium.”132  The FCC, contrary to the Bureau’s decision, found that the F-
word “in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls 
within the first prong of our indecency definition.”133  This was a major change 
in policy because past decisions had made it clear that a fleeting use of the F-
word without sexual connotation generally did not fulfill this first prong.134  
The FCC also stated that the F-word “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and 
explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language.  Its use 
invariably invokes a coarse sexual image.”135  Therefore, the F-word 
automatically fulfills the second prong of the indecency standard.  With both of 
these prongs met, the FCC found Bono’s remark actionably indecent.136 
The major change in this decision was the abrupt halt to the past FCC 
policy on fleeting expletives when the F-word was used.  The FCC found that 
any interpretation indicating that fleeting expletives are non-actionable is “no 
longer good law.”137  The FCC also emphasized that specific words do not 
need to be repeated to be considered patently offensive.138  Noting the policy to 
protect children, the FCC found that even the isolated use of this language 
could enlarge “a child’s vocabulary in a second.”139  Further, the FCC found 
that without action against isolated expletives, the use of this language would 
become more widespread.140  Finally, the FCC pointed out that there have been 
numerous technological advances which make it possible to delay broadcasting 
by several seconds, enabling these expletives to be bleeped out.141 
While the FCC argued that this decision was “not inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica,” the change of course by the FCC was 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. at 4977. 
 133. Id. at 4978.  The Enforcement Bureau, on the other hand, found the word ‘fuck’ to be an 
adjective or an intensifier.  Id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4979. 
 136. Id. at 4982. 
 137. Id. at 4980. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 4982. 
 140. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4979. 
 141. Id. at 4980. 
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clear.142  This decision put broadcasters on “clear notice that, in the future, they 
will be subject to potential enforcement action for any broadcast of the F-word 
or variation thereof in situations such as the one described here.”143  NBC, 
Viacom and Fox, among others, filed suit against the FCC’s new policy raising 
both statutory and constitutional issues.144  While this litigation was pending, 
the FCC applied its Golden Globes ruling to several subsequent cases. 
D. Omnibus Order- The FCC Tries to Clarify New Standards 
In 2006, the FCC acknowledged that many broadcasters felt its standards 
lacked certainty.145  On March 15, 2006, the FCC released a memorandum 
(Omnibus Order) filled with examples to provide “substantial guidance to 
broadcasters and the public about the types of programming that are 
impermissible under our indecency standard.”146  The Omnibus Order was 
divided into three categories.147  The first category had six examples where the 
FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability.148  The second category had four 
examples where the broadcasts were determined to be indecent, but 
nevertheless, no forfeiture was imposed.149  Finally, the third category 
contained twenty-eight examples of broadcasts that were not in violation of 
FCC indecency regulations.150 
In line with the recent Golden Globes decision, the FCC made it clear that 
any use of the F-word was presumptively indecent.151  In addition, the FCC 
 
 142. Id. at 4982.  The FCC’s change in policy is a clear departure from the Policy Statement 
issued in 2001. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 145. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and 
March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order]. 
 146. Id. at 2665. 
 147. See id. at 2670–2721. 
 148. See id. at 2670–90.  Examples include: “The Surreal Life 2,” “Con El Corazon En La 
Mano,” Fernando Hidalgo Show,” Video Musicales,” “The Blues: Godfathers and Sons,” and 
“The Pursuit of D.B. Cooper.” 
 149. See id. at 2690–2700.  Examples include: “The 2002 Billboard Music Awards,” “The 
2003 Billboard Music Awards,” “NYPD Blue” and “The Early Show.” 
 150. See Omnibus Order, supra note 145, at 2700–21.  Examples include: “Alias,” “Will and 
Grace,” “Two and a Half Men,” “Committed,” “Golden Phoenix Hotel & Casino Commercial,” 
“The Oprah Winfrey Show,” “Political Advertisement,” “The Amazing Race 6,” “Various 
Programs Containing Expletives (various dates between August 31, 2004 and February 28, 
2005),” “Family Guy,” “The Academy Awards,” “8 Simple Rules,” “The Today Show,” “The 
Simpsons,” “America’s Funniest Home Videos,” “Green Bay Packers v. Minnesota Vikings” and 
“Medium.” 
 151. Id. at 2685.  In each of these examples, the FCC pointed out that the word “fuck” was 
used and therefore, the broadcast was indecent.  “The Blues: Godfathers and Sons.”  Id. at 2684–
2685.  “The 2002 Billboard Music Awards.”  Id. at 2691.  “The 2003 Billboard Music Awards.”  
Id. at 2693. 
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found that the word “shit” is a “vulgar excretory term so grossly offensive” 
that it, too, was to be considered presumptively indecent.152  For these words to 
be broadcast without penalty, the broadcaster must show that their use was 
“essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work or essential to 
informing viewers on a matter of public importance.”153  This heightened 
scrutiny was not equally applied to other controversial curse words.154  With 
many broadcasters unsure about the parameters of FCC indecency regulations, 
the FCC had hoped that this Order would provide clarity to this murky 
subject.155 
E. Remand Order—The FCC Takes Another Look at the Omnibus Order 
On September 7, 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court granted a request by the 
FCC for a voluntary remand to review and address petitioner’s arguments.156  
Nearly two months later, on November 6, 2006, the FCC issued a new order 
(Remand Order) which revisited the second category within the Omnibus 
Order.157  This category addressed the four broadcasts that the FCC found to be 
indecent even though no fine was issued.158  This Remand Order is especially 
important because of its future role in Fox v. FCC. 
The first broadcast was the 2002 Billboard Music Awards.159  In this 
particular program, Cher proclaimed in her acceptance speech that “[p]eople 
have been telling me I’m on the way out every year, right?  So fuck ‘em.”160  
Fox argued that Cher’s use of the F-word was meant as a vulgar insult, not one 
 
 152. Id. at 2686.  In each of these examples, the FCC pointed out where the word “shit” was 
used and therefore, the broadcast was indecent.  “The Blues: Godfathers and Sons.”  Id. at 2684-
2685. “The Pursuit of D.B. Cooper.”  Id. at 2688.  “The 2002 Billboard Music Awards.”  Id. at 
2691.  “The 2003 Billboard Music Awards.”  Id. at 2693. “NYPD Blue.”  Id. at 2693.  “The Early 
Show.”  Id. at 2699. 
 153. Id. at 2700. 
 154. Id. at 2710.  The FCC looked at twenty complaints containing the words or phrases: 
“hell,” “damn,” “bitch,” “pissed off,” “up yours,” “ass,” “for Christ’s sake,” “kiss my ass,” “fire 
his ass,” “ass is huge” and “wiping his ass.”  They concluded that, while these words may upset 
some viewers, in the given circumstances their use did not rise to an actionable level of 
indecency.  Id. 
 155. Omnibus Order, supra note 145, at 2724.  Then Commissioner of the FCC, Michael J. 
Copps, wrote, “Although it may never be possible to provide 100 percent certain guidance 
because we must always take into account specific and often-differing contexts, the approach in 
today’s orders can help to develop such guidance and to establish precedents.”  Id. 
 156. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 157. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and 
March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order]. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 13322. 
 160. Id. 
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discussing sexual activities.161  The FCC rejected this claim and proceeded to 
explain their policy regarding the F-word and how it is presumptively 
indecent.162  This was the same method of application as applied in the new 
Golden Globe decision.  The FCC also rejected Fox’s claim that because the 
word was fleeting, it should not be actionably indecent.163 
The second broadcast was the “2003 Billboard Music Awards” where 
Nicole Richie asked the audience, “[h]ave you ever tried to get cow shit out of 
a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.”164  Similar arguments were made 
here by Fox regarding the use of the F-word and S-word.165  The FCC again 
rejected these arguments.166 
The third broadcast was “The Early Show.”167  During an interview, guest 
Twila Tanner responded to a question saying, “I knew he was a bullshitter 
from Day One.”168  The FCC acknowledged a more restrained position when 
dealing with news programming.169  The FCC explained that the strong ties 
between the First Amendment and news programming require a more 
deferential standard.170  In a change from the Omnibus Order, the FCC found 
that the F-word’s use in the news program was not actionably indecent.171 
Finally, several broadcasts of “NYPD Blue” were found to be indecent due 
to the words “bullshit,” “dick” and “dickhead” being said numerous times.172  
The FCC, however, reversed this ruling because they found that the complaint 
was filed for episodes that aired after 10:00 p.m. and before 6:00 a.m.173  
 
 161. Id. at 13323 (reasoning that the comment did not reach an actionable level). 
 162. Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13324.  (“The fact that she was not literally 
suggesting that people engage in sexual activities does not necessarily remove the use of the term 
from the realm of descriptions or depictions. This case thus illustrates the difficulty in making the 
distinction between expletives on the one hand and descriptions or depictions on the other.”). 
 163. Id.  (“As reviewed above, Commission dicta and Bureau-level decisions issued before 
our Golden Globe decision had suggested that expletives had to be repeated to be indecent but 
that such a repetition requirement would not apply to descriptions or depictions of sexual or 
excretory functions.”). 
 164. Id. at 13304. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Id. at 13305. 
 167. Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13326. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 13328.  (“In today's Order, we reaffirm our commitment to proceeding with 
caution in our evaluation of complaints involving news programming.”). 
 170. Id. at 13327.  (“In the Omnibus Order, we “recognize[d] the need for caution with 
respect to complaints implicating the editorial judgment of broadcast licensees in presenting news 
and public affairs programming, as these matters are at the core of the First Amendment's free 
press guarantee.”). 
 171. Id. at 13328. 
 172. Omnibus Order, supra note 145, at 2696. 
 173. See Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13329-30. 
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Therefore, they fell in the safe harbor zone protected by the First 
Amendment.174 
With the Remand Order released as the updated FCC policy, Fox 
petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on November 8, 2006, to 
review the Remand Order.175  Fox also consolidated the appeal with another 
one pending before the court.176  Finally, CBS and NBC successfully filed 
motions to intervene.177  With all of the confusion regarding the flurry of FCC 
indecency policies, this was the time for the Second Circuit to clarify the law 
for broadcasters.  Unfortunately, the court’s decision was ultimately a short-
term solution to a long term issue. 
IV.  FOX V. FCC 
The networks (Fox, CBS and NBC) raised several arguments against the 
validity of the FCC’s Remand Order.  These arguments included: 
(1) the Remand Order is arbitrary and capricious because the Commission’s 
regulation of “fleeting expletives” represents a dramatic change in agency 
policy without adequate explanation; (2) the FCC’s “community standards” 
analysis is arbitrary and meaningless; (3) the FCC’s indecency findings are 
invalid because the Commission made no finding of scienter; (4) the FCC’s 
definition of “profane” is contrary to law; (5) the FCC’s indecency regime is 
unconstitutionally vague; (6) the FCC’s indecency test permits the 
Commission to make subjective determinations about the quality of speech in 
violation of the First Amendment; and (7) the FCC’s indecency regime is an 
impermissible content-based regulation of speech that violates the First 
Amendment.178 
The court found the first argument persuasive and therefore did not reach any 
of the other claims made by the networks.179 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The court began by looking at the Administrative Procedure Act.180  Under 
this Act, courts are to set agency decisions aside if found to be “arbitrary, 
 
 174. See id. at 13329. 
 175. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Fox, 489 F.3d at 454.  5 U.S.C. § 706 states: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing 
court shall— 
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”181  
Agency action is considered arbitrary and capricious: 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered 
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view 
of the product of agency expertise.182 
The networks argued that the FCC’s change in policy for fleeting expletives, as 
supported in the Remand Order, was arbitrary and capricious for its lack of 
reasoned explanation.183 
The court looked to past decisions to determine whether there was a 
change in the FCC’s policy toward fleeting expletives.184  After a brief 
analysis, the court agreed with the networks that “there is no question that the 
FCC has changed its policy.”185  While agencies can change their policies, this 
change must be accompanied by “reasoned analysis for departing from prior 
 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 455. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Fox, 489 F.3d at 455. 
First, there is no question that the FCC has changed its policy. As outlined in detail above, 
prior to the Golden Globes decision the FCC had consistently taken the view that isolated, 
non-literal, fleeting expletives did not run afoul of its indecency regime. See, e.g., Pacifica 
Clarification Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, at 4 n. 1 (advising broadcasters that “it would be 
inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language” that occurred 
during a live broadcast without an opportunity for journalistic editing); Application of 
WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, at 10 & n. 6 (distinguishing between the “verbal 
shock treatment” of the George Carlin monologue and “the isolated use of a potentially 
offensive word” and finding that the single use of an expletive in a program “should not 
call for us to act under the holding of Pacifica”); Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 
2698, at 13 (“If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe that under 
the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently 
offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.” (emphasis added)); Industry 
Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, at 17–18 (distinguishing between material that is repeated or 
dwelled on and material that is “fleeting and isolated”) (citing L.M. Communications of 
S.C., Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 1595 (Mass Media Bureau 1992) (finding the single utterance of 
“mother-fucker” not indecent because it was a “fleeting and isolated utterance which, 
within the context of live and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a Commission 
sanction”); Lincoln Dellar, For Renewal of the Licenses of Stations KPRL(AM) and 
KDDB(FM), 8 F.C.C.R. 2582 (Audio Serv. Div.1993) (news announcer's remark that he 
“fucked that one up” not indecent because the “use of a single expletive” did not warrant 
further review “in light of the isolated and accidental nature of the broadcast”)). This 
consistent enforcement policy changed with the issuance of Golden Globes. 
Id. 
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precedent.”186  If an agency fails to do so, the agency’s action could be set 
aside as arbitrary and capricious.187 
The FCC’s primary explanation for the change in policy toward fleeting 
expletives was the ‘first blow’ theory.188  This theory was outlined in the 
original Pacifica Supreme Court decision.189  In Pacifica, the Court found that 
broadcast media, unlike other types of speech, enters the privacy of the home 
without warning.190  There, the Court rejected the argument that one could just 
turn off the radio if offensive material was being broadcast.191 The Court 
likened that argument to “saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away 
after the first blow.”192  Similarly, the FCC argued here that “fleeting 
expletives unfairly forces viewers to take the first blow.”193  The Second 
Circuit did not accept this explanation as being a reasoned enough basis for the 
FCC’s change in policy.194 
The majority found that this ‘first blow’ theory was contrary to the FCC’s 
policy for fleeting expletives.195  The inconsistency was located in an FCC 
exception where some fleeting expletives were considered actionably indecent 
in certain broadcasts but not in others.  In the Remand Order, the FCC found 
the statement “I knew he was a bullshitter from day one” to not be actionable 
because it was said in a news program.196  The FCC has also held that 
expletives aired during the movie Saving Private Ryan197 were not indecent 
 
 186. Id. at 456.  The court explains what is necessary for reasoned analysis: 
When an agency reverses its course, a court must satisfy itself that the agency knows it is 
changing course, has given sound reasons for the change, and has shown that the rule is 
consistent with the law that gives the agency its authority to act.  In addition, the agency 
must consider reasonably obvious alternatives and, if it rejects those alternatives, it must 
give reasons for the rejection, sufficient to allow for meaningful judicial review. (quoting 
N.Y. Council, Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 
508 (2d Cir.1985)). 
Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 457. 
 189. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
 190. Fox, 489 F.3d at 457 (describing the majority opinion in Pacifica). 
 191. Id.  at 457–58. 
 192. Id.  (“To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears 
indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first 
blow.”) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748). 
 193. Id. at 458 (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157 at 13309). 
 194. See id. at 459. 
 195. Fox, 489 F.3d at 459. 
 196. Id.  at 458. (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157, at 13326).  See also infra notes 
212–16 along with accompanying text. 
 197. Saving Private Ryan is an explicitly graphic movie depicting World War II.  Directed by 
Steven Spielberg, this movie won five academy awards in 1998.  The Internet Movie Database, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120815/ awards. 
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because of their importance to the artistic nature of the work.198  However, at 
both the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards, the use of the word “shit” 
was actionably indecent.199  In all of these scenarios, the listener was forced to 
suffer the ‘first blow’ from the broadcasted expletive.200  The inconsistency, 
the majority pointed out, was that only in certain circumstances was that ‘first 
blow’ considered actionably indecent.201 
The FCC’s defense was that they wanted to protect viewers from being 
forced to hear these expletives.202  The majority reasoned that if this were the 
case, why were fleeting expletives considered perfectly acceptable in certain 
circumstances?203  Viewers, especially children, may not be able to 
differentiate when an expletive is used for an exception listed above.204  The 
majority concluded that this lenient policy did not comport with the ‘first 
blow’ theory205 and that the FCC’s “proffered rationale [was] disconnected 
from the actual policy implemented by the Commission.”206 
The FCC also defended its policy that the F-word and S-word are 
presumptively indecent.  The FCC argued that even non-literal expletives were 
indecent due to the “difficult[y] to distinguish whether a word is being used as 
an expletive or as a literal description of sexual or excretory functions.”207  The 
majority rejected this argument as contrary to common sense.208  Pointing to 
several examples, the court illustrated that in numerous circumstances, a 
reasonable person would be able to know if the language referred to sexual 
activities or excretory organs.209 
The FCC claimed that the requirement of repeated use of expletives 
ignored the critical nature of context and that if a per se exemption of fleeting 
expletives were instituted, the result would be a significant increase in their use 
in future broadcasts.210  The majority pointed out that the FCC failed to 
 
 198. Fox, 489 F.3d at 458.  See Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding 
Their Broadcast on November 11, 2004, of the ABC Television Network’s Presentation of the 
Film “Saving Private Ryan,” 20 F.C.C.R. 4507 (2005). 
 199. Id. See also supra notes 159–66 along with accompanying text. 
 200. Id. at 459.   
 201. Id. at 458. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Fox, 489 F.3d at 458.  (highlighting the different treatment between Saving Private Ryan 
and the 2002 and 2003 Music Billboard Awards). 
 204. Id. at 459. 
 205. Id.  (“Thus, the record simply does not support the position that the Commission’s new 
policy was based on its concern with the public’s mere exposure to this language on the 
airwaves.”). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.  (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157 at 13308). 
 208. Fox, 489 F.3d at 459. 
 209. See id. at 459–60. 
 210. Id. at 460 (quoting Remand Order, supra note 157 at 13309). 
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provide convincing evidence that this increase would likely occur.211  The 
court even brought up an admission by the FCC acknowledging that fleeting 
expletives “never barraged the airwaves” before the Golden Globes 
decision.212  While the majority did agree with the FCC that the nature of 
context is critical, the court criticized the FCC for not taking context into 
consideration when declaring that all variants of certain words would be 
presumptively indecent.213 
The majority finally found that the FCC failed to explain why they enacted 
this new policy after nearly thirty years of precedent.214  The FCC claimed a 
primary interest in protecting children from indecent broadcasts.215  The 
majority, however, argued that this intention has remained the same since 
Pacifica was decided.216  Despite this continued interest, the FCC failed to 
explain how a fleeting expletive is harmful and why there was a need to 
regulate its use.217  Because the FCC failed to justify its changed policy 
regarding fleeting expletives, the court held that the Golden Globes decision, 
as applied in the Remand Order, was invalid under the Administrative 
Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious.218  The Remand Order was thereby 
vacated and the matter was sent back to the FCC.219 
B. Majority Opinion’s Dicta 
Recognizing the narrow scope of the holding, the court spent considerable 
time analyzing potential constitutional challenges as dicta.  While the dictum 
lacks the weight of the holding, the majority made several observations which 
could aid judicial efficiency if further litigation ensued.220  The court 
immediately announced their skepticism about whether the FCC would be able 
to create a reasoned explanation regarding their policy for fleeting 
expletives.221 
 
 211. See id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Fox, 489 F.3d at 460  (referencing the FCC’s standard that the words “fuck” and “shit” 
are presumptively indecent). 
 214. See id. at 461. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 462. 
 218. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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Generally, regulations of speech that are protected by the First Amendment 
must withstand strict scrutiny.222  There is, however, an exception for 
broadcast media, requiring only that the regulation be “narrowly tailored to 
further a substantial government interest.”223  While the Supreme Court has 
approved the FCC’s ability to regulate indecent material, the FCC’s indecency 
standard has been attacked as “undefined, indiscernible, inconsistent, and 
consequently, unconstitutionally vague.”224  Detailing the inconsistencies of 
the FCC’s indecency policy, the court made it clear that they were sympathetic 
to the argument that the policy was not narrowly tailored.225  The court also 
looked to Reno v. ACLU,226 a 1997 Supreme Court decision that dealt with an 
indecency regulation for the internet.227  This similarly worded regulation228 
was found to have violated the First Amendment since it was too vague and “it 
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to 
constitutional protection.”229  While internet regulations are different from 
broadcast regulations, the court mentioned their skepticism that the FCC’s 
indecency standard could survive a similar constitutional attack.230  The 
majority also found potential constitutional issues with the subjectivity of the 
FCC’s ability to sanction speech,231 the level of scrutiny used,232 and the 
 
 222. Id. at 462–63.  For strict scrutiny, “the government must both identify a compelling 
interest for any regulation it may impose on indecent speech and choose the least restrictive 
means to further that interest”.  Id. at 463. 
 223. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462-63.  Broadcast media is an exception because it is uniquely 
pervasive.  See also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id.  The court looks to the differential treatment between Saving Private Ryan and 
the 2002 and 2003 Music Billboard Awards to highlight the potential vagueness of the standard.  
Id. 
 226. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  The Court stuck down an internet indecency 
regulation for being unconstitutionally vague.  Id. 
 227. Fox, 489 F.3d at 463. 
 228. The regulation covered speech that “in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs.”  Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 464. 
 231. See id.  (“The Supreme Court has cautioned against speech regulations that give too 
much discretion to government officials.”) (quoting Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992)). 
 232. Id.  (“We recognize there is some tension in the law regarding the appropriate level of 
First Amendment scrutiny.”).  Currently, the court doesn’t use strict scrutiny for media 
broadcasts.  However, the networks argue that perhaps strict scrutiny should be used.  While 
broadcast media is not as uniquely pervasive as it used to be, current constitutional precedent has 
established that broadcast media faces an intermediate level of scrutiny.  Id. at 465. 
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FCC’s construction of the word ‘profane.’233  After this discussion, the court 
concluded that it is “doubtful that by merely proffering a reasoned analysis for 
its new approach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can adequately 
respond to the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the 
networks.”234 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
In Judge Leval’s dissent, he argued that the FCC satisfied its requirement 
by giving adequate reasoning for changes under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.235  Ultimately, Judge Leval found that the FCC “gave a sensible, although 
not necessarily compelling, reason” for the change in policy regarding fleeting 
expletives.236  The FCC reasoned that the F-word “is one of the most vulgar, 
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language” 
and that “its use invariably invokes a coarse sexual image.”237  Thus, its use, 
even if isolated, violated § 1464.238  This explanation, the Judge argued, should 
be enough to satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.239 
Judge Leval next addressed the argument that the FCC’s standard lacked 
consistency.240  Acknowledging that the new policy did not follow an all-or-
nothing policy,241 Judge Leval pointed out that the FCC is applying standards 
based on the context of the broadcast.242  Thus, the policy actually increased 
the consistency of FCC rulings by drawing clear lines for specific contexts.243 
The majority argued that the FCC was “divorced from reality” when they 
claimed that a major increase of expletives would occur without the 
implementation of their new policy.244  The dissent argued that these are just 
two different predictions and that the court must be deferential to the agency’s 
judgment.245 
 
 233. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 465–66.  The court suggests that the FCC’s use of profane may 
have difficulty passing constitutional muster.  This is due to the FCC’s current interpretation of 
profane meaning essentially the same thing as indecent.  Id. 
 234. Id. at 467. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 469. 
 237. Id. at 470 (citing Golden Globes II, supra note 13 at 4979). 
 238. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 470; § 1464, supra note 20. 
 239. Fox, 489 F.3d at 470. 
 240. Id. at 471. 
 241. Fleeting expletives that are integral to a piece of work or that occur on a bona fide news 
program could be excused whereas the same expletive on a regular broadcast would be 
considered indecent.  Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Fox, 489 F.3d at 460. 
 245. Id. at 472.  Judge Leval even goes on to say that the FCC’s prediction is probably more 
accurate. 
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Finally, the dissent addressed the FCC’s argument that the F-word 
communicates “inherently. . . sexual connotation [and] invariably invokes a 
coarse sexual image.”246  Judge Leval agreed with the majority that the F-word 
can be used without referring to sexual activities.247  However, he stressed that 
the majority misinterpreted the FCC’s reasoning.248  A correct reasoning, he 
argued, was that “even when the speaker does not intend a sexual meaning, a 
substantial part of the community, and of the television audience, will 
understand the word as freighted with an offensive sexual connotation.”249  
Therefore, given the nature of the F-word, this interpretation of the FCC policy 
was not irrational, arbitrary or capricious.250  After analyzing these multiple 
factors, Judge Leval concluded that the FCC had a reasoned explanation for 
their changed policy regarding fleeting expletives.251 
V.  ANALYSIS OF THE FOX DECISION 
The decision in Fox v. FCC failed to answer many questions that had 
plagued broadcasters since the FCC began cracking down on indecent 
broadcasts.  While the court came to a logical conclusion, the majority opinion 
failed to adequately address the true issue of whether a fleeting expletive could 
ever be constitutionally regulated.  As a result of the court’s decision, many 
broadcasters were left confused regarding what constituted an acceptable 
broadcast. 
This analysis will begin with a discussion of the majority and dissenting 
opinion in Fox v. FCC.  Specifically, I will address the following issues: the 
‘first blow’ theory, the presumptive indecency of the F-word and S-word, and 
the policy regarding fleeting expletives.  This discussion will include a short 
recap of the court’s findings and examine whether the court’s conclusions were 
logical. 
 
First, the words proscribed by the Commission’s decency standards are much more 
common in daily discourse today than they were thirty years ago.  Second the regulated 
networks compete for audience with the unregulated cabel channels, which increasingly 
make liberal use of their freedom to fill programming with such expletives.  The media 
press regularly reports how difficult it is for networks to compete with cable for that 
reason.  It seems to me the agency has good reason to expect that a marked increase 
would occur if the old policy were continued. 
Id. at 472–73. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 473.  Judge Leval lists several examples where the word “fuck” was not used 
literally. “A student who gets a disappointing grade on a test, a cook who burns the roast, or a 
driver who returns to his parked car to find a parking ticket on the windshield.”  Id. 
 248. Fox, 489 F.3d at 473. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 474. 
 251. Id. 
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A. ‘First Blow’ Theory 
The majority reasoned that the FCC’s policy was incompatible with the 
‘first blow’ theory because under certain circumstances, fleeting expletives 
were acceptable for some broadcasts while in others, the same words were 
considered indecent.252  Originating from the Pacifica decision, the ‘first blow’ 
theory emphasized that in the privacy of the home, one has the right to be left 
alone from indecent material.253  Here, the majority ignored the initial critical 
question of whether the material was indecent.  When determining indecency, 
both the Supreme Court and the FCC have made it clear that context is an 
important consideration.254  The FCC has found that expletives used in bona 
fide news programming or expletives which are integral to a piece of work are 
generally outside of the definition of indecent material.255 Therefore, the use of 
these words in these particular contexts falls outside the ‘first blow’ theory 
because the use of the words was not indecent.  Curiously, the majority 
appeared to ignore this contextual analysis.  Instead, the majority focused on 
how viewers may lack the requisite understanding that the expletives were 
integral or part of a news program.  Regardless of the validity of this claim, the 
‘first blow’ theory emphasizes that an individual in the privacy of his own 
home only has the right to be left alone from indecent material.  The majority 
mistakenly combined both decent and indecent broadcasts when finding the 
FCC policy to be inconsistent.  However, when separated properly, the ‘first 
blow’ theory used by the FCC is consistent in that the FCC regulates 
broadcasts so that listeners are not forced to withstand indecent material. 
As the dissent illustrates, this approach is an attempt by the FCC to 
reconcile conflicting values.256  Without a flexible approach focused on the 
context of the broadcast, the FCC’s approach would have to follow an all-or-
nothing standard.  After all, if one word was determined to be indecent, its use 
at any time outside of the safe harbor period of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. would 
not be acceptable regardless of its context.  This sort of policy is contrary to 
both the FCC’s policy and the past precedent of the Supreme Court. 
B. Presumptive Indecency of the F-word and S-word 
While the majority incorrectly analyzed the ‘first blow’ theory, it correctly 
pointed out the logical inconsistency in the FCC’s finding that the F-word and 
the S-word are presumptively indecent.257  The use of the F-word and S-word 
 
 252. See id. at 457–58. 
 253. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
 254. See id. at 742–43.  See Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8002. 
 255. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text. 
 256. Fox, 489 F.3d at 472. 
 257. The FCC found that the F-word and S-word are presumptively indecent because it is 
“difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether a word is being used as an expletive or as a 
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can vary greatly in meaning, depending on the context.  For example, Bono’s 
statement “really, really, fucking brilliant” is a clear, non-literal use of the 
word “fuck.”  As the Bureau initially contended, this word was used as an 
adjective or intensifier.258  Even in the review of the Golden Globes decision, 
the FCC stated that the “full context in which the material appeared is critically 
important.”259  By having a list of presumptively indecent words, the FCC’s 
policy altogether ignores the importance of context when determining whether 
material is indecent. 
The dissent argued that the F-word and S-word is loaded with an offensive 
sexual or excretory connotation and that no matter the literal or non-literal use, 
viewers will understand it as such.260  This interpretation is too general to be 
applicable.  In numerous examples, a reasonable person would be able to 
conclude that the F-word or S-word is used non-literally.  The FCC’s broad 
generalization of these words could lead to suppression of protected speech. 
The FCC’s policy is also contrary to past precedent.  In Pacifica, the 
Supreme Court found George Carlin’s monologue to be indecent because of 
the “repetitive, deliberate use” of certain words.261  Several Bureau decisions 
later relied on this precedent.262  Shortly after Pacifica, the Bureau made it 
clear that material believed to be offensive by some is not enough to warrant 
regulation.263  In 2001, the FCC issued a Policy Statement to help broadcasters 
understand what the FCC found to be indecent.264  In one included example, 
the F-word was used.265  The FCC found that this single usage of the F-word 
was just a fleeting expletive and that, given the context, was not indecent.266  
While this policy changed in the Golden Globes decision, the explanation for 
that change lacked a reasonable basis.  As mentioned above, common sense 
and context dictate the meaning behind the uses of these so called 
presumptively indecent words.  Therefore, this component of the FCC policy 
was arbitrary and capricious. 
C. Fleeting Expletives 
The majority also rejected the FCC’s argument that a per se exemption on 
fleeting expletives would result in a significant increase in their use during 
 
literal description of sexual or excretory functions.”  Id. at 459 (quoting Remand Order, supra 
note 157, at 13308). 
 258. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19861. 
 259. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4977–78. 
 260. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 473. 
 261. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978). 
 262. See WGBH, supra note 78, at 1251. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 7999. 
 265. Id. at 8009. 
 266. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] OUT ON A LIMB WITHOUT DIRECTION 411 
future broadcasts.267  The Remand Order provided no information indicating 
that fleeting expletives were harmful to viewers.268  In fact, no evidence was 
given indicating that an increase was likely to occur.269  The dissent correctly 
noted that these predictions are speculative at best.270  Nevertheless, the FCC’s 
concern that excessive fleeting expletives will flood the airwaves lacks 
particular merit.  Even if the FCC is correct, an increase in fleeting expletives 
could take their use out of the realm of fleeting altogether.  If numerous 
controversial words were said during a broadcast, the FCC could look to the 
context of the entire broadcast and find that the language was not fleeting, but 
rather, that a pattern permeated the program.  This type of scenario would 
make the broadcast actionably indecent. 
For the twenty-five years before the review of the Golden Globes decision, 
both the courts and the FCC had a clear policy that fleeting or isolated 
expletives were generally not actionable.  In Pacifica, the “repetitive, 
deliberate use” of certain words was determined to be indecent.271  Justice 
Powell, in his concurrence, distinguished the FCC’s power to regulate verbal 
shock treatment found in Carlin’s monologue from isolated use of a potentially 
offensive word.272  Shortly after Pacifica, the Enforcement Bureau rejected an 
allegation that WGBH’s broadcasts were indecent.273  It reasoned that more 
than just an expletive had to be found to warrant an indecent broadcast.274  In 
1979, the Bureau found that an announcer repeatedly using variants of the F-
word was not indecent because of its isolated use.275  In 1987, the 
Reconsideration Order factored into its patently offensive analysis the question 
of whether material was isolated or fleeting.276  In 2001, the FCC’s new Policy 
Statement gave an example where a man said “mother-fucker” during a 
broadcast.277  The FCC found this to be fleeting and isolated and not enough to 
warrant a sanction.278  Finally, in 2003, Bono said “fucking brilliant” during 
his acceptance speech at the Golden Globe Awards.279  The initial Enforcement 
Bureau decision stated that this was not actionably indecent because it was 
 
 267. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 268. Id. at 462. 
 269. Id. at 460. 
 270. Id. at 472. 
 271. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739 (1978). 
 272. Id. at 760_61. 
 273. WGBH, supra note 75, at 1251. 
 274. Id. 
 275. WPFW, supra note 78, at 757. 
 276. Reconsideration Order, supra note 82, at 932. 
 277. Policy Statement, supra note 99, at 8009. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Golden Globes, supra note 1, at 19859. 
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fleeting and isolated and that the word was used as an intensifier.280  This 
standard, which enjoyed a long line of precedent, was subsequently reversed in 
the review of the Golden Globe decision.281 
Because the Fox court correctly found that the F-word and S-word should 
not be considered presumptively indecent, the FCC’s explanation for fleeting 
expletives completely crumbles.  The FCC can no longer claim that the use of 
the F-word or S-word automatically is indecent and that their single use fulfills 
the two prong indecency requirement. 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
While policy considerations are important, the subtle, yet underlying 
conflict lies in the broadcaster’s constitutional rights versus the FCC’s right to 
regulate indecency.  “The Constitution gives significant protection from 
overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment’s vast and 
privileged sphere.”282  In the dictum accompanying the decision in Fox, the 
majority confessed their skepticism that the FCC could “provide a reasoned 
explanation for its fleeting expletive regime that would pass constitutional 
muster.”283  All indecent speech is protected under the First Amendment.284  
The FCC, however, can regulate this speech if there is both a substantial 
governmental interest and the FCC is utilizing the least restrictive means to 
further that interest.  The majority in Fox appeared sympathetic to an argument 
that the FCC’s indecency test is overbroad.285  With so many caveats for when 
certain expletives could be broadcast, the indecency standard lacked the clarity 
constitutionally required by the First Amendment.286  In Reno v. ACLU, a 
regulation similarly worded to the FCC’s indecency standard was found to 
violate the First Amendment because of its indirect effect on speech.287  Like 
Reno, the FCC’s vague and overbroad standard could violate the First 
Amendment by effectively silencing speech that is entitled to protection. 
The court should have used this constitutional approach when deciding the 
outcome of this case.  During oral arguments, the court was fully briefed on the 
 
 280. Id. at 19862. 
 281. Golden Globes II, supra note 13, at 4982. 
 282. Ian J. Antonoff, You Don’t Like It . . . Change the (Expletive Deleted) Channel!: An 
Analysis of the Constitutional Issues that Plague FCC Enforcement Actions and a Proposal for 
Deregulation in Favor of Direct Consumer Control, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 253, 
263 (2005). 
 283. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 463.  The networks contend that the FCC indecency test “is undefined, 
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally vague.”  Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
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constitutional issues regarding the updated FCC policy.288  Rather than rule on 
constitutional grounds, the court found that the FCC violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act.289 
The majority’s conclusion was problematic in that the FCC could have 
revisited the Remand Order and created a more reasonable explanation for 
their altered policy, satisfying the requirements laid out in the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  If this scenario had hypothetically occurred, the broadcasters 
would have been in the same position that they were pre-Fox.  The networks 
would then put forth the same argument that the FCC’s policy violated their 
rights.  The majority’s dictum indicated that a change to the FCC’s reasoning 
would likely not be enough to survive constitutional scrutiny.290  This warning 
by the court, however, was not enough.  Assume the FCC had come up with a 
new explanation for their change in policy.  The result would have meant 
significant confusion among the broadcasting community.  Broadcasters would 
have had to decide whether to follow the new FCC policy or rely on a potential 
constitutional claim that the FCC was exceeding their power to regulate 
broadcasts. 
Had the Supreme Court not granted certiorari, broadcaster confusion 
coupled with increasing fines for indecency could have led to a chilling effect 
on protected speech.  This is because broadcasters could become hesitant to 
release material which might be considered indecent because of the threat of 
significant fines.291  This also could lead to others not speaking on the air for 
fear of penalty.292  Furthermore, news programming and informational 
broadcasts could have faced more scrutiny by editors which could have led to 
distorted information.293  It goes against a good public policy of encouraging a 
variety of ideas.294  Each of these possible scenarios would have negatively 
affected both networks and viewers.  This subtle assault on the freedom of 
speech would not have gone unnoticed by the networks. 
The Fox court stated that “[a] fundamental and longstanding principle of 
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in 
advance of the necessity of deciding them.”295  The court failed to recognize 
that the FCC and broadcasting industry had hit a crossroads where fundamental 
questions arose to the legality of the FCC policies.  For resolution of these 
issues, it was necessary for the court to determine the constitutionality of the 
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FCC’s regulatory policies.  Since this was not accomplished, the scenario that 
these same parties would meet in the courtroom was inevitable. 
VII.  SUPREME COURT GETS INVOLVED 
Inevitable it was.  Rather than create a new explanation on remand or 
request an en banc rehearing, the FCC appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court.296  On March 17, 2008, the Supreme Court granted the Solicitor 
General’s petition for certiorari.297  With oral arguments by the parties 
scheduled for fall of 2008, the Supreme Court appears poised to provide the 
clarity that the Second Circuit decision failed to impart.  First, I will outline the 
arguments that the FCC, Fox and NBC provided in their certiorari petitions on 
why Fox v. FCC should or should not be revisited.  Then, I will discuss these 
positions and analyze some possible scenarios and outcomes that could take 
place when the Supreme Court hears this case. 
After a weak decision in Fox and the continued confusion that has ensued, 
it is essential that the Supreme Court address the substantive challenges to the 
controversial FCC policy to get to the heart of the FCC’s authority to regulate 
fleeting expletives.  Otherwise, broadcasters will continue to question what 
constitutes an acceptable broadcast.  With an increasingly vigilant eye towards 
punishment and ever-increasing fines for indecent broadcasts, the result could 
lead to the suppression of protected speech out of a fear for potential indecency 
findings. 
A. FCC’s Argument for Why Certiorari Should Be Granted 
The question presented by the FCC to the Supreme Court was “whether the 
court of appeals erred in striking down the Federal Communications 
Commission’s determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may 
violate federal restrictions on the broadcast of ‘any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language,’ when the expletives are not repeated.”298  The FCC 
proffered three reasons why the Supreme Court’s review was warranted.299 
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1. The Decision in Fox v. FCC Conflicted With the “Context Driven 
Approach Governing Broadcast Indecency” Upheld in the Supreme 
Court Decision in Pacifica. 
The FCC first argued that the Second Circuit failed to adequately take a 
broadcast’s context into consideration.300  Countervailing interests, such as 
First Amendment concerns, have led the FCC to not penalize the use of the F-
word during bona fide news programming.301  This contextually based 
exception is premised on the notion that First Amendment concerns force the 
FCC to “proceed with the utmost restraint.”302 
The Pacifica decision focused on the FCC’s authority to regulate indecent 
broadcasts.303  Justice Stevens emphasized that “we must consider [a 
broadcast’s] context in order to determine whether the Commission’s action 
was constitutionally permissible.”304  In Fox, the court found that the ‘first 
blow’ theory of protecting broadcast audiences did not comport with the FCC’s 
contextual approach to fleeting expletives.305  The FCC claimed that this 
conflicts with the Pacifica decision, in which the Supreme Court recognized 
the ‘first blow’ theory while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of 
context.306  The FCC pointed out that “[o]nce it is recognized that (1) a 
particular graphic utterance can service as a ‘first blow’ that can cause 
immediate damage, and (2) context matters, it follows logically that there is no 
mandate for a per se rule of either prohibition or license.”307  The FCC tried to 
take context into consideration for those words they deemed could “serve as a 
‘first blow.’”308  The Second Circuit’s decision, the FCC argued, failed to 
recognize this necessary contextual component and therefore was contrary to 
the Pacifica decision.309 
2. The Second Circuit’s Decision was “Inconsistent with Settled 
Principles of Administrative Law and Conflicts with a Decision of the 
D.C. Circuit.” 
The Second Circuit found that the FCC violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act by failing to give a reasoned basis for its change in policy 
regarding fleeting expletives.310  The Second Circuit maintained that the FCC 
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needed to explain “why it has changed its perception that a fleeting expletive 
was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for the nearly thirty years between Pacifica and 
Golden Globes.”311  The FCC defended their policy as another step in 
protecting children from indecent broadcasts.312  The Second Circuit, however, 
wanted “record evidence” to support their contentions.313  The FCC countered, 
arguing that this requirement was above and beyond what was necessary under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.314  The FCC pointed to previous decisions 
that found that an “agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, 
either with or without a change in circumstances”315 and that an agency may 
reconsider “the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”316  Therefore, an 
agency may rationally change their policy if the “prior policy failed to 
implement properly the statute.”317  The FCC argued that their change in policy 
regarding fleeting expletives was in recognition that their prior policy failed to 
adequately implement § 1464.318  Also, in Action for Children’s Television v. 
FCC, the court stated, “the Supreme Court has never suggested that a scientific 
demonstration of psychological harm is required in order to establish the 
constitutionality of measures protecting minors from exposure to indecent 
speech.”319  The FCC contended that the Second Circuit’s requirement for 
record evidence in addition to a fuller explanation to their change in a thirty 
year policy was more than was required under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.320 
3. Importance of the Question Presented 
The FCC acknowledged that generally, when a case is remanded back to 
an agency, such a decision does not usually warrant the Supreme Court’s 
review.321  However, this situation, the FCC claimed, presented a unique set of 
facts.322  The FCC argued that they had already fully explained their reasoning 
for changing their policy.323  Not only this, but the Second Circuit indicated 
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their belief that the FCC would not be able to adequately respond to the court’s 
concerns on remand.324  This put the FCC in a no-win situation.  Additionally, 
the decision in Fox struck down the FCC’s policy, effectively instituting a per 
se exemption for fleeting expletives.325  The FCC claimed that: 
at a minimum, the decision of the court of appeals is likely to generate 
considerable confusion for the commission- which has pending before it 
hundreds of thousands of complaints regarding the broadcast of expletives, 
both isolated and repeated- and for broadcasters, leaving them uncertain as to 
the standards that are to govern the Commission’s enforcement of the statutory 
prohibition on broadcast indecency.326 
Without a clear avenue for clarification through the Second Circuit, the FCC 
argued that the Supreme Court should get involved.327 
B. Fox’s Argument for Why Certiorari Should Be Denied 
The question presented by Fox to the Supreme Court was “[w]hether the 
court of appeals correctly held as a matter of administrative law that the FCC 
failed to provide a reasoned basis for reversing its long-standing indecency 
enforcement policy with respect to isolated and fleeting expletives.”328  Fox 
offered three reasons why the Supreme Court should deny the petition.329 
1. There is No Conflict Between the Second Circuit’s Decision and 
Pacifica 
Fox immediately pointed out that the Supreme Court has never ruled on 
the issue of the FCC’s authority to regulate fleeting expletives under § 1464.330  
In Pacifica, the Court explicitly stated that “[w]e have not decided that an 
occasional expletive . . .would justify any sanction.”331  In Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion, he stated that “[t]he Commission’s holding, and certainly 
the Court’s holding today, does not speak to cases involving the isolated use of 
a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast.”332  The FCC 
argued that the majority in Fox rejected the “context-driven approach 
governing indecency that this Court upheld in Pacifica.”333  Fox rejected this 
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contention by arguing that the decision in Fox was “simply a garden-variety 
remand for lack of explanation; it contains no substantive holding with respect 
to ‘context.’”334  The Fox court found that “the Commission’s proffered 
rationale [first blow theory] is disconnected from the actual policy 
implemented by the Commission.”335  The principle behind the ‘first blow’ 
theory, that individuals should not be forced to withstand the initial blow of 
indecent language, failed to mesh with the policy where numerous ‘blows’ 
were permitted.336  A reasoned explanation for the FCC’s change in policy is 
especially important because the regulation strikes at the heart of the First 
Amendment.337  When little to no explanation is given, confusion and self-
censorship could permeate the networks.338  Since the Second Circuit 
remanded the case back to the FCC on administrative grounds, Fox argued that 
Pacifica was neither implicated nor contradicted.339 
2. “The Second Circuit’s Decision is Consistent With Settled Principles 
of Administrative Law and Does Not Conflict with Action for 
Children’s Television” 
“The Process by which [an agency] reaches [its decreed] result must be 
logical and rational.  Courts enforce this principle with regularity when they set 
aside agency regulations which. . .are not supported by the reason that the 
agencies adduce.”340  Fox asserted that the Second Circuit appropriately 
applied the legal principles found in the Administrative Procedure Act.341  The 
court reviewed and rejected the FCC’s change of policy because it failed to 
give a reasoned explanation for its departure from past precedent.342  Fox 
argued that this was standard judicial protocol.343 
The FCC argued that the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with the 
decision in Action for Children’s Television v. FCC.344  The D.C. Circuit Court 
did not require Congress to present record evidence that minors were being 
harmed from “exposure to sexually explicit material.”345  Fox distinguished 
this case for two reasons.  First, “ACT [Action for Children’s Television] 
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involved a constitutional challenge to a speech regulation.”346 Here, the issue 
was administrative.  Second, the decision in ACT dealt with “hard-core 
pornography- not isolated words.”347  Therefore, the decision by the Second 
Circuit, Fox argued, was consistent with both administrative law and past 
precedent.348 
Fox’s final argument was that the remand does not warrant Supreme Court 
review.349  This argument, however, failed to gain traction with the Supreme 
Court. 
C. NBC’s Argument for Why Certiorari Should Be Denied 
The question presented by NBC to the Supreme Court was “[w]hether the 
court of appeals erred in holding that the Commission had failed to explain 
adequately the abrupt reversal of its longstanding determination that fleeting 
and isolated utterances of expletives generally fall outside the Commission’s 
definition of broadcast indecency.”350  NBC proffered three reasons why the 
Supreme Court should deny the petition.351 
1. “The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied This Court’s Administrative 
Law Precedents” 
NBC argued that there was no conflict between the FCC and the Second 
Circuit on whether the correct legal standard was applied.352  Rather, the 
conflict arose out of a disagreement on whether the explanation given by the 
FCC was adequate.353  This explanation, NBC claimed, had to be provided by 
the agency because “[c]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc 
rationalizations for agency action.”354  NBC pointed to the Remand Order and 
the FCC’s initial insistence that there was never a policy change regarding 
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fleeting expletives.355  The FCC reasoned that the F-word should be considered 
presumptively indecent because “[g]iven the core meaning of the F-word, any 
use of that word has a sexual connotation even if it is not used literally.”356  
NBC argued that the FCC failed to “explain how the F-word came to develop 
the ‘core meaning’ the Commission never seemed to discern before” and to 
“justify its conclusion with reasoned argument and evidence.”357  Without the 
requirement of proper explanation, the FCC could redefine words on a whim 
without any limit to their power.358 
NBC also pointed out that the Remand Order was “devoid of any evidence 
that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful, let alone establishes that this harm 
is serious enough to warrant government regulation.”359  Distinguishing this 
case from Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, NBC argued that “it was in 
that context that the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that the Commission 
was required to demonstrate that indecent speech caused harm to minors.”360  
Without a reasoned basis behind the FCC’s change in policy, NBC argued that 
no error was committed in remanding the case back to the FCC.361 
2. There is No Conflict With This Court’s Decision in Pacifica 
Similarly to the petition by Fox, NBC highlighted how the decision in 
Pacifica had “not decided that an occasional expletive. . .would justify any 
sanction.”362  That issue has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court.363  NBC 
also argued that the First Amendment holding in Pacifica “is not even 
implicated here because the court of appeals did not reach the broadcasters’ 
First Amendment challenge.”364  Nevertheless, the FCC claimed that the 
Second Circuit’s decision conflicted directly with the “context-driven 
approach” found in Pacifica.365  NBC argued that there were two flaws in this 
argument.  First, “Pacifica did not announce ‘the context-driven approach 
governing broadcast indecency’ that the Commission says it did.”366  There 
was no disagreement, as in Fox, over whether the language used was “patently 
offensive.”367  Rather, “context was relevant in Pacifica to determine whether 
 
 355. Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *16. 
 356. Id. at *18. 
 357. Id. at **18–19. 
 358. See id. at **19–20. 
 359. Id. at *21. 
 360. Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *21. 
 361. Id. at *22. 
 362. Id. at *24 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978)). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at *23. 
 365. Brief in Opposition of NBC, 2008 WL 320501 at *23. 
 366. Id. at *25. 
 367. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] OUT ON A LIMB WITHOUT DIRECTION 421 
the sanction imposed on repeated, deliberately broadcast, and concededly 
indecent speech violated the First Amendment.”368  NBC’s second argument 
was that the Second Circuit’s decision does not prohibit the FCC from 
considering the nature of the program when determining whether the broadcast 
is patently offensive.369  The third factor in the patent offensiveness test is 
“whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the 
material appears to have been presented for its shock value.”370  For example, 
certain broadcasts that show genitalia are not ‘patently offensive’ when shown 
educationally.371  The ‘first blow’ theory does not address this contextual 
analysis.  The ‘first blow’ theory, NBC argued, failed to give adequate 
reasoning for the abandonment of the second factor of the patent offensiveness 
test which focused on “whether the material dwells on or repeats at length 
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities.”372 
NBC, like Fox, also failed to convince the court that the remand does not 
warrant the Supreme Court’s review.373 
As a validation to the confusion and problems resulting from the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Fox, the Supreme Court announced their decision to grant 
certiorari and review the case.374  While the Supreme Court is by no means 
bound to the question presented and arguments found in the FCC’s petition, 
these will serve as a guidepost for what the Court may be interested in hearing 
during oral arguments next fall. 
D. Issues the Supreme Court Will Likely Address 
The FCC’s question presented to the Court was “[w]hether the court of 
appeals erred in striking down the Federal Communications Commission’s 
determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may violate federal 
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restrictions on the broadcast of ‘any obscene, indecent, or profane language,’ 
when the expletives are not repeated.”375  The very fact that the Court granted 
certiorari indicates some dissatisfaction toward the Second Circuit’s 
decision.376  The Supreme Court will likely first address the Second Circuit’s 
decision to remand the case for the FCC’s failure to satisfy the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  For the Supreme Court to adequately resolve the confusion 
plaguing broadcasters and the FCC alike, the Court must determine whether 
the FCC satisfied the Administrative Procedure Act or whether there are policy 
considerations to bypass this administrative hurdle. 
1. Administrative Procedure Act 
“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”377  
The FCC reasoned that their change in policy was based on the belief that the 
F-word “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual 
activity in the English language” and that “its use invariably invokes a coarse 
sexual image.”378  Therefore, its use, even if isolated, violated § 1464.379  The 
FCC argued in their petition that an agency is permitted to change their policy 
if the “prior policy failed to implement properly the statute.”380  Here, the FCC 
determined that their pre-Golden Globes policy failed to adequately regulate 
indecent speech because fleeting expletives received nearly a ‘free pass’ from 
regulation.381  The networks, on the other hand, will contend that the change in 
FCC policy was not accompanied by the requisite reasoned basis.382  The FCC 
failed to give any explanation for their decision to overrule thirty years of 
precedent.383  Also, the rationale for why the F-word and S-word became 
presumptively indecent lacks common sense given the plethora of differing 
definitions in differing contexts.384  Both the FCC and the network’s arguments 
are persuasive.  While the Second Circuit laid out a strong explanation for why 
the FCC failed this administrative hurdle, the Supreme Court will most likely 
give more deference to agency decision-making. 
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The Court might find alternative reasons to bypass the administrative 
hurdle altogether.  Despite its seemingly innocent logic, Fox and NBC harbor 
an impractical view regarding the Second Circuit’s decision.  Both networks 
argued that the FCC should come up with a reasoned explanation for their 
change in policy.  If the FCC were to satisfactorily do this, the court would 
move past the Administrative Procedure Act and would reach the substantive 
challenges in this case.  The problem with this logic is that it ignores the reality 
of the Second Circuit’s position.  In the dictum accompanying the Fox opinion, 
the majority wrote “we are doubtful that by merely proffering a reasoned 
analysis for its new approach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can 
adequately respond to the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the 
networks.”385  In the FCC’s petition for certiorari, the FCC outlines the 
position the Fox court left them: 
The court has thus sent the Commission back to run a Sisyphean errand while 
effectively invalidating much of the Commission’s authority to enforce 18 
U.S.C. 1464.  In the meantime, the Commission is left in the untenable 
position of having a grant of authority that the public expects it to exercise, and 
that Pacifica allows it to exercise, but that the Second Circuit has indicated 
cannot be meaningfully exercised consistently with that court’s view of the 
APA and the First Amendment.386 
While the networks are correct in stating that the Second Circuit never 
substantively addressed the FCC’s regulatory authority, a fair reading of the 
entire opinion illustrates the court’s view that the FCC’s policy regarding 
fleeting expletives would most likely not survive judicial scrutiny. 
Had the Supreme Court not accepted review, the FCC would have likely 
come up with a new explanation for their change in policy regarding fleeting 
expletives.  This situation would have resulted in significant confusion among 
broadcasters.  After all, broadcasters would have had to decide whether to 
abide by the updated FCC policy or rely on a potential constitutional claim 
outlined in the Second Circuit’s dictum.  This confusion could have lasted for 
several years due to the time it takes for a case to be reheard along with a 
potential request to the Supreme Court on appeal.  With the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari, the Court must move beyond this administrative issue and 
address the substantive challenges to the FCC indecency policy. 
2. Does Fox v. FCC Conflict With Pacifica? 
One of the most heavily briefed issues was whether the Second Circuit’s 
decision conflicted with Pacifica.  The FCC contends that the Second Circuit’s 
decision conflicted with the “context-driven approach governing broadcast 
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indecency upheld in Pacifica.”387  Specifically, the FCC reasons that the 
Second Circuit decision incorrectly rejects the FCC’s contextual approach to 
determining whether a broadcast is indecent.388 
In Pacifica, Justice Stevens wrote that “we must consider its [a 
broadcast’s] context in order to determine whether the Commission’s action 
was constitutionally permissible.”389  The FCC argues that the Pacifica 
decision supports the notion that countervailing concerns regarding First 
Amendment protection and artistic importance must be taken into 
consideration when determining indecency.390  After all, in Pacifica, the Court 
recognized simultaneously the ‘first blow’ theory and the importance of 
context.391  Using this contextual approach, the FCC found that the use of the 
F-word during a bona fide news program could be excused whereas the same 
word used during an awards show could be considered indecent.392  Similarly, 
the FCC found that the use of the F-word and S-word in the airing of the movie 
Saving Private Ryan was not indecent because of their importance to the 
artistic nature of the work.393The FCC argues that this approach, rather than a 
per se prohibition or exemption of specific words altogether, represents a better 
approach to public policy.394  This cleverly put together argument, however, 
fails to properly frame the issue. 
The FCC’s argument is both misdirected and fundamentally flawed.  The 
argument is misdirected because the FCC focuses too squarely on the Second 
Circuit’s criticism of the ‘first blow’ theory.  In Fox, the majority emphasized 
how the rationale behind the ‘first blow’ theory did not comport with the 
FCC’s actual policy.  This disconnect occurred because viewers were forced to 
suffer the ‘first blow’ of the F-word or S-word even in broadcasts that the FCC 
determined to be appropriate due to their context.  Viewers, especially 
children, may not be able to differentiate the difference between the use of 
expletives in a typical action movie compared to their use in Saving Private 
Ryan.  The FCC misconstrues this discussion to mean that the Second Circuit 
advocated a per se exemption for fleeting expletives without any consideration 
toward context.  This is not correct.  Rather, the Second Circuit was explaining 
how the reasoning behind the FCC’s change in policy failed to satisfy the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
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The FCC’s policy regarding fleeting expletives is also fundamentally 
flawed.  Ironically, the FCC’s policy, rather than the Second Circuit’s decision, 
ignores the importance of context laid out in Pacifica and its progeny.  By 
instituting a policy where the F-word and S-word are presumptively indecent, 
the FCC is effectively eliminating the necessary contextual component.  The 
FCC claims that it is “difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether a 
word is being used as an expletive or as a literal description of sexual or 
excretory functions.”395  The Second Circuit rightly found that this lacks 
common sense.  The F-word and S-word carry a variety of meanings when 
used in different contexts.  By making these words presumptively indecent, the 
FCC is disregarding the base of their very own argument: that contextual 
analysis is critical.  For these reasons, I do not believe the Supreme Court will 
find the Second Circuit’s decision directly contrary to the Pacifica decision. 
3. Supreme Court Must Address the Substantive Issues to Assuage 
Broadcaster Confusion 
As both Fox and NBC emphasized in their petitions, the Supreme Court 
has never directly ruled on the issue of the FCC’s authority to regulate fleeting 
expletives under § 1464.396  Justice Stevens and Justice Powell both made it 
clear in Pacifica that their holding did not speak to fleeting and isolated 
expletives.397  For the thirty years after Pacifica, the FCC practiced a policy 
where fleeting expletives were not generally actionable.398  With the FCC’s 
abrupt change in policy, the Supreme Court will likely determine whether the 
FCC has the authority under § 1464 to regulate fleeting expletives. 
Because the Second Circuit never ruled on any of the substantive 
challenges to the FCC indecency policy, the Supreme Court may approach this 
issue from a variety of angles.  This makes the case very hard to predict.  
Issues such as the congruency between the FCC policy and Congressional 
intent, the constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency test and the level of 
scrutiny broadcast speech receives, for example, could come to the foreground 
of the discussion regarding the FCC’s regulatory authority.  For the Court to 
adequately resolve the issue of the FCC’s authority, it must not sidestep the 
network’s substantive challenges.  After all, if the Supreme Court fails to 
address these challenges, broadcasters will continue to question the FCC’s 
authority, leading to an excess of Enforcement Bureau appeals and 
unnecessary future litigation. 
 
 395. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Remand 
Order, supra note 157, at 13308). 
 396. Brief in Opposition of Respondent, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2008 WL 
320502 at *10. 
 397. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 747; see id. at 760–61. 
 398. See supra notes 271–81. 
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CONCLUSION 
When people think of U2’s lead singer Bono, most think of either his 
musical career or his charitable efforts around the world.  The FCC, on the 
other hand, sees Bono in a different light.  Because of his remark during the 
2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono set off a firestorm which became part of the 
catalyst for the FCC’s dramatic departure from past regulatory policy.  Seeking 
to punish broadcasters for any fleeting uses of the words “fuck” and “shit,” the 
new FCC Policy did not sit well with the networks, resulting in the case being 
heard before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  Rather than addressing the 
FCC’s constitutional boundaries for regulating broadcasts, the Fox Court ruled 
against the FCC on administrative grounds.  By rejecting the FCC’s policy as 
“arbitrary and capricious,” the court found that the policy lacked the adequate 
reasoning necessary for a shift in agency policy.  The decision failed to create 
clear guidance for broadcasters, resulting in a short-term solution to a long-
term problem. With a temporarily invalidated Remand Order, a decision that 
continued to keep networks guessing and the threat of speech being chilled, the 
Supreme Court stepped in and granted certiorari.  This very act of granting 
certiorari most likely indicates some level of dissatisfaction with the Second 
Circuit’s decision.  With a bevy of potential issues, the Court will face the task 
of outlining the boundaries of the FCC’s regulatory authority.  If the Supreme 
Court is serious about addressing the confusion regarding the FCC’s ability to 
regulate fleeting expletives, they must address the issues that the Second 
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